The “Productivity Paradox” of IT, Security, and AV

By Paul Konikowski, CTS-D

This article orginally published in Commercial Integrator on October 29, 2019.

In the 1990’s, Erik Byrnjokfsson wrote a series of papers beginning with “The Productivity Paradox of Information Technology” (1993) where he analyzed the relationship between information technology (IT) and productivity. Initial studies showed that, on average, IT investments had increased greatly from the mid-1970’s to the mid-1990’s; but at the same time, there was no measurable increase in productivity due to the increased spending on IT.

In fact, some studies showed a drop in productivity over the previous two decades, especially in so-called white-collar jobs, even though the demand for professionals and computer-literate employees surged. Many attributed the negative correlation to mismanagement of IT.

As Byrnjokfsson and others dug deeper into the data, and as IT went from strictly transactional usage to being a daily part of everyone’s job in a typical office environment, it became apparent that the return on investment (ROI) of IT depended largely on the company that was implementing it.

The firms that were doing things the same old way they had done before, but adding IT to it, were becoming less productive. At the same time, other firms seemed to be capitalizing on their IT investments.

The differentiating factor was that these firms were not only implementing new technology, but they were also implementing organizational changes, aligning their business strategy with their software and hardware, and vice versa.

The old processes were revamped to better utilize the advancements in technology, and more efficiently. This sort of organizational change often required changes in management; or at least a change in attitude.

A similar Productivity Paradox can be said about information security: the more security that you have, the more it can seem to interfere with your work. Firewalls and malware detection can slow down network response time.

Periodic password changes and/or multi-factor-authentication (MFA) can be seen as a hinderance. But you have to take a step back to consider the potential impact of a data breach or ransomware attack, and how much productivity your firm would lose if your phones didn’t work, your servers were wiped clean and/or your data was held hostage for a few weeks.

Getting Over the Productivity Paradox

So companies must find the right balance: the systems have to be secured, but they also must be done so as efficiently as possible, and at the right cost. One analogy might be a padlock versus card key access through a door.

Both secure the door, but the padlock is seen as a greater inconvenience, while the card key costs more to implement. Retinal scans and other biometrics provide an even higher level of security, but cost a lot more than a key card reader.

AV systems and collaboration tools must also be chosen and implemented as part of a larger strategy, along with proper management and changes to processes. You can’t just buy a fancy new Surface Hub and put it in a conference room and hope it will make your workers more productive.

New collaboration tools like Microsoft Teams and Slack are drastically changing the workflow of many companies, but they won’t do it automatically. Managers need to present a clear vision of how to use these new tools, and be willing change the company’s processes, and possibly the structure, to better leverage the technology.

If you enjoyed this article, you might like these related posts:

Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in Audiovisual Control Systems and Protocols

Design Principles For Secure AV Systems

Identifying Cyber Attacks, Risks, Vulnerabilities in AV Installations

 

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Danger! Logic Bombs in Audiovisual Control Systems

So-called Logic Bombs haven’t quite found their way into audiovisual control systems yet, but just wait…The unprepared will suffer.

This article was originally published in Commercial Integrator on July 9, 2019

Logic bombs are a form of malicious code whose effects are purposefully delayed by design. The name “logic bomb” stems from the classic ticking bomb imagery often depicted in James Bond type movies. The logic bomb initially goes unnoticed during its dormant phase, and is triggered by elapsed time, a specific date, or some combination of inputs. Logic bombs are common in computer malware, but haven’t been reported in audiovisual control systems, so you have to use your imagination a little.

Here are a few examples:

  • A logic bomb could be programmed into an AV control system, so that after a projection screen is lowered and raised 100 times, the logic bomb is triggered, and the AV system no longer functions properly.
  • A logic bomb could be set so that it is triggered on a specific date some time in the future.The AV system works fine until July 1, 2020, and then suddenly, it stops working, even if the AV system is rebooted.
  • A logic bomb could also be triggered by a certain combination of inputs.

Let’s say you have a 4-way divide/combine space that is typically separated into 4 rooms, A, B, C and D. The system is tested and works when the rooms are separated or combined into 1. But when you try to divide the rooms into A&B and B&C, it suddenly stops working.

Any permutation of the three examples above could also be combined, making the logic bomb is harder to detect.

Logic bombs in computer systems are often triggered by a certain login. Imagine if every time a particular CEO used a video conference system, it recorded and/or streamed the call to a hidden endpoint.

Who on Earth would do this?

The answer is: anyone with malicious intent.

An external hacker who has infiltrated a business network could replace the audiovisual control system with similar code that includes a logic bomb, which could open a back door for them at a later date, and/or forward logins and other valuable information out through the firewall.

This would make the security breach harder to attribute to a specific IP address or individual.

Another scenario might be a malicious internal attacker. Perhaps an on-prem AV support technician asked for a raise and did not get it.

Once they found a new job elsewhere, the jaded individual could replace the AV control system code with one that included a logic bomb. The logic bomb could be set to go off during a big annual meeting, or gather valuable information that could then be sold to a company’s competitors.

AV integrators could also implement logic bombs to generate unnecessary service calls.

Most AV systems are warrantied for the first year. After a year, the client has an option to continue the service plan on an annual basis. If they don’t have a service plan, the customer has to pay for each service call that is placed.

The best defense against logic bombs are passwords that limit the access to the audiovisual control system code. Any device on the LAN should be locked down using access controls on network switches.

Customers should also demand uncompiled copies of the final AV control system code, and watch the AV integrator upload that code to the AV system at the very end of the project, so they know there are no logic bombs.

LOGIC BOMB in the form of binary code, 3D illustration

If you enjoyed this article, you might like these related posts:

My 3-Tiered Approach to Networked AV Security

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Identifying Cyber Attacks, Risks, Vulnerabilities in AV Installations

5 Steps to Better Cyber Risk Management

The Best Data Breach Incident Response Plans Require These Steps

 

My 3-Tiered Approach to Networked AV Security

How should the industry provide a whole culture of networked AV security? It could start with these three steps.

This article was originally published in Commercial Integrator on June 5, 2019

Over the last few years, the audiovisual integration industry has become increasingly more aware of networked AV security concerns, largely due to some vulnerabilities discovered in control system touchscreens and wireless presentation systems. Manufacturers have answered with firmware updates that patch the vulns, and AVIXA released Recommended Practices for Security in Networked AV Systems in July 2018

Despite these efforts, many #AVTweeps are still calling for networked AV security standards and industry leadership. We can’t just sit back and wait for cybersecurity researchers to tell us about the next zero-day vulnerability. We need to take a proactive approach and work together to leverage our knowledge.

So how do we get started?

One idea would be to launch an open group that anyone can join, like the Ad Hoc Committee on Responsible Computing Group, who publishes a regularly updated document called “Moral Responsibility for Computing Artifacts”, more commonly referred to as “The Rules.”

Or we could take a more formal approach and follow the lead of the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI-SSC) which is an independent body that was created by major payment card brands.

The PCI-SSC sets the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS).

That approach might work for AV manufacturers, but it might also inadvertently leave out integrators, consultants, distributors, IT professionals, and AV support personnel that work inside of organizations. All of these groups make up the AV industry, and each has their own priorities.

To involve all of these parties while still maintaining some order, I suggest a three-tiered approach:

Cybersecurity Leadership at the Industry Level

At the top tier would be a Cybersecurity Council led by audiovisual industry associations like Avixa and/or NSCA, who would work to develop standards and promote best practices in networked AV security.

The Cybersecurity Council might host annual or bi-annual 1-day or 2-day virtual conferences, where speakers and panel discussions could address market-wide security concerns.

The Council would promote cybersecurity awareness, as well as the adoption of industry-specific cybersecurity frameworks.

Cybersecurity Alliances at the Company Level

At the next tier would be Cybersecurity Alliances, which would be groups of companies that have similar interests and business models.

There could be a Manufacturers’ Alliance, an Integrators’ Alliance, and an End-Users’ Alliance (we will have to think of a better name).

AV consultants and distributors could have their own alliances, or they may fall into one of the other Alliances to keep things simple. The main goal here would be for similar companies to share threat information and strategies, much like the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), who aims to make the internet safer and more secure for everyone.

The Alliances could host quarterly online meetings, but could also alert each other when they are attacked, or when a vulnerability has been discovered, as many AV companies utilize the same OEM technology.

Cybersecurity Teams of Individuals

The third tier would consist of teams of individuals, from any of the above Cybersecurity Alliances, who would focus on specific aspects of cybersecurity.

There could technical teams made up of CIOs, CTOs, programmers, and technicians who focus on recent exploits, risks and vulnerabilities, cloud security, network design, data protection, application development, access controls, forensic analysis, cryptography, incident response, intrusion detection, cyber-physical systems, databases, or web security.

There could also be non-technical teams who would be focused more on laws and regulations, procedures, and policies. They could work together to train employees, update documents, conduct risk and liability assessments, develop industry bug bounty programs, or share ransomware response plans.

The goal of this column is not to dictate what I think should be done, but rather to present a potential framework to use as a basis of discussion. My hope is that individuals within the AV industry will talk to Avixa and/or NSCA at Infocomm or other events, and maybe these ideas will get some traction by 2020.